A decision problem is characterized by a loss function V and opinion H. The pair (V, H) is said to be strongly stable iff for every sequence Fn~w H, Gn~w Hand L n~V, W n~V uniformly,
1. Introduction. "Subjectivists should feel obligated to recognize that any opinion (so much more the initial one) is only vaguely acceptable. (I feel that objectivists should have the same attitude.) So it is important not only to know the exact answer for an exactly specified initial position, but what happens changing in a reasonable neighborhood the assumed initial opinion." De Finetti, as quoted by Dempster (1975) .
A well-known principle of personalistic Bayesian theory is that no one can tell someone else what loss function to have or what opinion to hold. Having said that, the reasons for looking into properties of particular choices of loss functions and opinions might be obscure.
The standard of personalistic Bayesian theory may be too severe for many of us. Generally when a personalistic Bayesian tells you his loss function and opinion, he means them only approximately. He hopes that his approximation is good, and that whatever errors he may have made will not lead to decisions with loss substantially greater than he would have obtained had he been able to write down his true loss function and opinion.
There are two special cases that have been considered. In the first, one cannot (or need not) obtain one's exact prior probability. Stone (1963) studied decision procedures with respect to the use of wrong prior distributions. He emphasized the possible usefulness of nonideal procedures that do not require full specification of the prior probability distribution. Fishburn, Murphy and Isaacs (1967) and Pierce and Folks (1969) also discussed decision making under uncertainty when the decision maker has difficulty in assigning prior probabilities. They outlined six approaches that may be used to assign probabilities. In the second case, one cannot obtain one's exact utility function. Britney and Winkler (1974) have inyestigated the properties of Bayesian point estimates under loss functions other than the simple linear and quadratic loss functions. They also discussed the sensitivity of Bayesian point estimates to misspecification in the loss function. Schlaifer (1959) and Antelman (1965) discuss relating the utility of the optimal decision to the utility of suboptimal decisions in certain contexts.
The closest related work, however, is the material on stable estimation in Edwards, Lindeman and Savage (1963) . They propose that there is data such that the likelihood function will be sufficiently peaked as to dominate the prior distribution. The criterion for robustness is that the densities of various possible posterior distributions are close.
Another important line of comparison is the work on robustness in the classical context, as exemplified for instance, in Andrews et al. (1972) , Bickel and Lehmann (1975a, b) and Huber (1972 Huber ( , 1973 . While they study how estimates change as a consequence of outliers, we study here how the worth of the estimates change.
To give an initial formalization of our question, suppose that the parameter space is E> C R k for some k, and the decision space is 9" C JRl for some I. If Foo(fJ) is my (approximate) opinion over fJ E E>, and L oo ( fJ, D) my (approximate) loss function, the (approximate) loss of the decision problem to me is (1) which is here assumed to be finite. Then for every c > 0, there is a decision D oo(c) which is c-optimal, that is (2) Suppose, however, that my "true" opinion over E> is on a sequence F n(fJ) which converges to F oo(fJ) in a sensei to be specified later. Also suppose that my "true" loss function over e is L n ( fJ, D) which converges to L oo ( fJ, D) again in a sense to be specified later. Then there is a sequence of "true" losses generated by and a sequence of losses generated by behaving according to the approximate opinion and loss function: The motivation for these definitions is that if an opinion and loss function are strongly stable, then small errors in either will not result in substantially worse decisions. If, on the other hand, a Bayesian finds that the loss function and opinion he has written down are unstable, then he may wish to reassess his loss function and opinion to be certain that no errors have been made. When he finds he has written down a loss function and opinion which is weakly but not strongly stable, a Bayesian may choose to make the stabilizing decision to have protection against errors in either the loss function or opinion.
There are a number of interesting and potentially enlightening choices that might be made for the sense of convergence of F n to F00 and L n to L oo • In this paper we chose to start with weak convergence in the distribution and uniform convergence in both arguments in the losses. Another choice worthy of study is to take the likelihood function as known and agreed upon, a weakly convergent sequence of priors, and study the resultant sense of convergence in the posterior opinions. The sense of convergence studied here is the special case in which that agreed-upon likelihood function is flat, which is equivalent to considering fuzziness in the likelihood function on the same footing as fuzziness in the prior. Perhaps the more general sense of convergence is closer yet in spirit to the work of Edwards, Lindeman and Savage (1963) .
We also note that uniform convergence in the loss sequence is a very strong The second definition has the attractive feature that it permits the reader another interpretation: the apparent truth can be on a sequence (L n , F n ) approaching the fixed truth (V, H). Definition 2 allows both the apparent truth (L n , F n ) and the actual truth (W n , G n ) to be sequences, and is thus more general in the sense that any pair (H, V) that is stable by Definition 2 is clearly stable by Definition 1. All theorems in this paper proving stability have been proved for Definition 2 so they apply to Definition 1 as well. However, all counterexamples to stability have been counterexamples by Definition 1. Hence all statements about the stability or instability of pairs (H, V) in this paper apply to both definitions. This observation leads us to conjecture that Definitions 1 and 2 might be equivalent. Section 2 introduces Definitions 3 and 4 which are apparently simpler than Definition 2, and shows their equivalence to Definitions 1 and 2. Then some simple examples are given. In Section 3, bounded loss functions that are continuous in the right way are examined, and shown to be strongly stable when paired with any opinion. Finally Section 4 takes up estimation (or, equivalently, prediction) loss functions subject to a Lipschitz-condition restraint on growth, and finds some of them strongly stable, and some unstable. To simplify matters, assume the one-dimensional case (k == I == 1).
2. A general structure theorem and some examples. In the first part of this section we introduce two more definitions of strong (weak) stability, Definitions 3 and 4, and show their equivalence to Definitions 1 and 2, respectively. The greater simplicity of the new definitions helps to simplify the rest of the paper.
Define, for every c > 0, the decision Doo(c) as in (2) . Then (Loo ' Foo ) is strongly (weakly) stable (by Definition 3) iff for every sequence F n~w F and for every (for some) such Doo(c), 
By exactly the same argument as above, substituting L"" for W"" and F"" for G"", we have
Finally, taking Dn(c) defined by (4) , c' == 3c and Dn'(c') defined by (4) 
where band c are assumed to be positive.
Since our purpose is to show a counterexample to stability, we temporarily adopt Definition 3.
Then
== either (depends on Dn(c» 
The following lemma shows that these concepts are related in the same way that continuity and uniform continuity are.
LEMMA 1. Suppose f(x, y) is continuous in x uniformly in y on a compact set XES. Then f is uniformly continuous in x uniformly in y.
The proof is a simple extension of the proof that a continuous function on a compact set is uniformly continous, and is therefore left to the reader. Then there exist points of continuity of
for all D and for a k~0~a k+1k == 0, ... , s -1. Let
Then for any distribution function G(O),
Since 
Applying this to H(0) yields

IV(O, D) -Ve(O, D)/ dH(O)~(2B + l)c .
Applying it to Fn(O) and noting that Fn(a) -) H(a), Fn(b)~H(b), yields that, for large enough n,
Since c is arbitrary, Lemma 2 is proved. 0 
0 EXAMPLE 4. Take the same example as Example 3, only restrict the domain, so that 9" == E> == C where C is some compact subset of R. Then squared error satisfies the condition of Theorem 2, and is therefore strongly stable when paired with any opinion H by both Definitions 3 and 4.
4. Estimation or prediction loss functions with bounded growth. In this section, the following assumptions are frequently used: 
The existence of the mean of H implies that 
By the Helly-Bray theorem there exist 
Now F n~( J) H, so if Dn*(e) is a sequence of e-optimal decisions for (F n , V) then 
and So any c-optimal decision De for H must satisfy
H(b) -H( -b) r
Let b i be a continuity point of H chosen so that b i > Yo and The following example shows that conditions (i) and (ii) and symmetry of h around zero (h(x) == h( -x» are not sufficien t to assure strong stability of (V, H).
.. , and let h( -x) == h(x).
Then h is continuous, symmetric, piece-wise linear, nOlldecreasing in (0, (0), nonincreasing in (-00, 0), and satisfies h(O) == 0 and the Lipschitz condition. Now let H be the distribution function of the random variable sure to take the value 0 == 0, and since we are looking for a counterexample, we take Definition 
Thus the c-optimal decision for H cannot be greater than b + Do. Similarly 
5.
Conclusion. An alternative method of presentation of our results would have been to stress that we are studying a particular kind of continuity, and that the subscript n has no real-world counterpart. We find the statement of the theory in terms of sequences to be, easier to understand and, we hope, accessible to a wider audience. There are, of course, alternative topologies that might be imposed on this problem and whose consequences would be interesting to explore.
Our aim has been to study stability as an approach to a personalistic Bayesian theory of robustness. We intend for our results to be used not artificially to al ter loss functions very far from the origin to achieve a theoretical advantage of no practical consequence, but rather as a way of learning more about the underlying structure of Bayesian decision theory, in much the same way that large-sample theory can be used in sampling theory-we often do not know whether the large sample theory is relevant, but it is a good guide to intuition. Added in Proof. The dissertation of David T. Chuang (1978) shows that the conjectured equivalence of Definitions 1 and 2 is false in general but true for the estimation/prediction case. He also finds in that case that if a loss function is strongly stable with one opinion it is strongly stable with all opinions, and characterizes stable loss functions. Necessary and sufficient conditions are also given for stability in the more general case in which the likelihood function is considered known and fixed.
